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The issue of human rights in China has been in the news
with increasing frequency the past few years. In May 1989, the
Tiananmen Square prodemocracy demonstrations1 were vividly
brought into our homes on television, and the unarmed demon-
strators captured our hearts with their sincere yearning for lib-
erty and democracy. 2 The brutal crackdown by a unit of the
ironically named People's Liberation Army outraged American
viewers. The poignant smashing of the "Goddess of Democ-
racy"' and the fatal shooting or bayoneting of 500 to 1,000 of the
demonstrators 4 can never be forgotten nor forgiven. Most
important, the hard-line government earned "the resentment of
the people China needs most: the young, the intelligent, the
energetic and innovative."5 This incident is but one example of
China's poor record on human rights.6
The human rights situation in China has been documented
by many observers, including the U.S. State Department.7 The
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1. See, e.g., Beijing Bloodbath, NEWSWEE-, June 12, 1989, at 24 [hereinafter
Beijing Bloodbath].
2. One demonstrator, asked by a television interviewer at the time, replied he was
not really sure what democracy meant to him but he wanted more of it. CNN News,
(CNN television broadcast, June 2, 1989). An analysis of the virtues and problems of
Western-style democracy and individual liberties is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Kishore Mahbubani, The Dangers of Decadence, FoRaiGN AFF., SeptJOct. 1993
at 10, 14.
3. Beijing Bloodbath, supra note 1, at 24.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 29.
6. See, e.g., Don't Flinch on Tibet, N.Y. TIEs, Mar. 11, 1994, at A30.
7. See generally U.S. DEVT OF STATE, CoUmRY REPoRTs ON HUmAN RiGHTs
PRACTICES FOR 1993 (1994) [hereinafter CouNTRY REPoRTs 1993].
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United States places primary importance on concerns such as
the denial of a fair public trial,' the harsh implementation of
population control programs,9 strict restrictions on the free-
doms of speech and press, 10 the lack of ability for peaceful and
legal change of government or government officials," the de
facto discrimination against women despite legal equality,' 2
and the inability of workers to form a trade union independent
of government control.' 3
There are a few bright spots, however. For example, China
released some prominent political prisoners on medical parole
in 1993.14 Moreover, China continues to allow more citizens to
emigrate than the United States allows to immigrate.' 5
Despite recent improvements, most observers agree that
the quality of human rights in China needs to be improved.'
6
The question is which course of action the U.S. government can
take to help the situation improve. It is tempting for Americans
to try to improve human rights in China by using the threat of
trade sanctions, specifically the denial of Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) tariff rates. This course of action, however, may harm
the very people we most want to help and may slow, rather than
accelerate, the improvement of human rights in China.
Because there is an historical link between the economic
power possessed by any group of people and the political rights
enjoyed by that group, this Article argues that the best way for
the United States to promote human rights in China is to assist
China's economic development. This argument is supported by
logic (e.g., demonstration of cause and effect) as well as by
example (e.g., the recent histories of Korea and Taiwan).
Part II of this Article takes a detailed look at what MFN
status really means and looks at the history of U.S. grants of
8. See id. at 7-11.
9. See id. at 12-13. Population control is implemented through a "one-child" policy,
which is inconsistently administered. Abortion and sterilization are commonly used,
although the government officially opposes forcing such measures. Id.
10. See id. at 13.
11. See id. at 21.
12. See hi. at 23.
13. See hi. at 26.
14. See id. at 1.
15. RicHARD H. SOLOMON, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA AND MFN: ENGAGEMENT,
NOT ISOLATION, IS CATALYST FOR CHANGE 5 (Current Policy No. 1282, 1990). The right
to emigrate is the original basis for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and remains its sole
criterion. See infra part II.B.
16. See, e.g., A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind: Berlin '38 to Beijing '94, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1994, at A15.
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MFN status to China. Part II also analyzes the 1993 executive
order conditionally renewing MFN status for China and
explores some of the grounds for opposing MFN status renewal.
Part III explains the causal connection between economic
development and the resulting development of human rights.
Part III also examines the Chinese economy and suggests that
the U.S. policy of using MFN status as a reward or punishment
is misguided. Part IV lends further support to the relationship
of economic development and human rights by reviewing the
past and present shift of economic and political power from cen-
tral governments to citizens. Finally, Part V warns of the
effects of the perceived hypocrisy in U.S. foreign and domestic
policy.
II. USE OF MFN STATUS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Definition of MFN Status
Most-Favored-Nation status is a misnomer, as it is really
the ordinary tariff level applicable to most of our trading part-
ners.17 Products from some nations receive reduced or no tariffs
under various free trade agreements or under the system of
tariff preferences for certain goods from certain developing
countries.' 8 A nation that does not have MFN status is subject
to the punitively high tariffs under the protectionist Smoot-
Hawiey Act, 19 which is widely regarded as having contributed
to leading the United States into an economic depression into
which the rest of the world followed.20
MFN status is not preferential treatment for products from
a few countries. MFN status does not imply the granting of a
favor, nor is it reserved to a few favorite trading partners. The
United States currently denies MFN status to only ten coun-
tries.2' The primary effect of granting MFN status to a country
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, 61 Stat. A3, A12,
55 U.N.T.S. 187, 196 [hereinafter GAIT].
18. The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is set forth in 19 U.S.C.-
§§ 2461-2466 (1988).
19. Id. § 1301.
20. See WILLIAM H. OvERHoLT, TiE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 391 (1993).
21. Countries denied MFN status by the United States and subject to the rate of
duty in Column 2 include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cuba, Kampuchea (Cambodia),
Laos, North Korea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. U.S. INr'L
TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2449, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE U.S. 2 (1992)
[hereinafter HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE]; see also Proclamation No. 6577, 58 Fed.
Reg. 36,301 (1993) (deleting Romania); Proclamation No. 6544, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,547
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is that merchandise produced there may enter the United
States under normal (Column 1) rates of duty for each product,
rather than under the discriminatory Smoot-Hawley (Column
2) rates.22
B. Methods for the United States To Extend MFN Status to
Other Nations
Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)23 presumes MFN status among the over one hundred
states (called "contracting parties") that have acceded to the
terms of GATT: "With respect to customs duties.., imposed on
... importation... any advantage, favour, privilege or immu-
nity granted by any contracting party to any product originat-
ing in... any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in... the territo-
ries of all other contracting parties."2
Initially, nonmarket economies (NME) 25 were denied inclu-
sion in GATT.26 The basic reason for the exclusion was that the
(1993) (substituting Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkministan, and Uzbekistan for
U.S.S.R.); Proclamation No. 6445, 57 Fed. Reg. 26,921 (1992) (deleting Albania).
22. See HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 21, at 2. To determine the rate
of tariff for a product, one must find the appropriate classification number of that
product in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule and then read across to the appropriate
column-Column 1 "General" for most MFN goods, Column 1 "Special" for goods that
receive lower tariffs or enter free (e.g., under the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement of 1989, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, or the
Generalized System of Preferences legislation of the U.S.), or COlmn= 2 for all other
goods. See id.
23. GAT I, supra note 17.
24. Id. at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196, 198. Nonetheless, the United States may in its
discretion withhold MFN status from a GATT member, as it has done in the case of
Cuba. See HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 21, at 2. Congress has authorized
the President to maintain a total trade embargo with Cuba. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(aXl)
(1988).
25. The term "nonmarket economy" is commonly used to describe countries
where goods and resources are allocated by government planning agencies
rather than by prices freely set in a market.... In general, the Communist bloc
countries are viewed as having nonmarket economies, while the developed
Western countries are viewed as having market economies. This
categorization is not as precise as might be desired. For example, some
members of the Communist bloc, in particular Hungary and China, have
recently instituted new economic rules that permit market forces to play a role
in some sectors of their economies.
JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 1174 (2d ed. 1986).
26. Paul Lansing & Eric Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-
Nation Status for Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARv. INTL
L.J. 329, 337 (1984).
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lower tariffs under MFN are designed to generate greater quan-
tities of imports. This naturally occurs when private buyers in
a market economy find imports relatively more attractive
because lower tariff duties result in lower net purchase prices to
those buyers." But where a NME is itself the purchaser and, in
effect, pays any import tariffs to itself, lower tariff rates do not
lower the net purchase price to that NME and therefore do not
increase the quantity purchased by the NME.28
The United States may choose to grant MFN status to a
NME, as the United States intended to do with the U.S.S.R.
after the May 1972 summit meeting in Moscow. 29 Restrictive
Soviet emigration policies at the time caused Senator Jackson
and Representative Vanik to sponsor legislation restricting the
authority of the President to extend MFN status to any NME
that denied its citizens the right to emigrate or imposed more
than a nominal fee on emigration.3 ° The so-called Jackson-
Vanik Amendment was signed into law as Title IV of the Trade
Act of 1974.3 '
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment provides the President
with discretionary authority to grant nondiscriminatory trade
status by Executive Order for successive twelve-month periods
to any NME that adheres to certain standards regarding free-
dom of emigration. 32 Congress may, however, pass, within a
prescribed time, a joint resolution denying the extension of
MFN status.3 If the President vetoes such joint resolution,
Congress must override the veto within a prescribed time or the
Executive Order will remain effective. 4
Negotiations for the accession of the People's Republic of
China to GATT are now underway. 35 The timing, and even the
ultimate success, of the GATT membership negotiations are not
known.36 Whether or not China accedes to GATT as a NME,
27. Id. at 340.
28. Id.
29. Michael Beasley et al., Note, An Interim Analysis of the Effects of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example, 8 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 193, 195 (1976).
30. Id. at 196.
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2431 (1988).
32. Id. § 2432(c), (d)(1).
33. Id. § 2432(d)(1).
34. Id. § 2432(d)(1)-(2).
35. OVERHOLT, supra note 20, at 388.
36. "In March 1993, the official in charge of such things in Washington, Donald
Newkirk, said that he would be retiring in seven years and doubted that China would
fulfill the requirements by then." Id.
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any U.S. extension of MFN status to China must, at a mini-
mum, comply with the terms of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment.3 7
Renewal or denial of MFN status to China has many more
implications than what tariff rate will apply to imported goods
from China. The following sections trace the history of MFN
status in China before 1993 and discuss the 1993 Executive
Order granting MFN status, opposition arguments against fur-
ther renewal, China's view of this as meddling with internal
affairs, and finally an alternative nonpolitical measure of
human rights.
C. MFN Status for China
1. History Before 1993
The United States first extended MFN treatment to the
People's Republic of China on February 1, 1980, under the pro-
visions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 38 China has received
an extension of MFN status each year since 1980, but not with-
out significant congressional protests in several years. 9
. In both 1991 and 1992, Congress passed joint resolutions
opposing extension, which former President Bush vetoed.40 The
House overrode those vetoes but the Senate narrowly failed to
do so.41 This set the stage upon which the new Clinton Admin-
istration entered.
2. 1993 Executive Order
On May 28, 1993, President Clinton by Executive Order
No. 12,850 renewed China's MFN status for the twelve-month
period beginning July 3, 1993.42 The Executive Order described
further renewal in 1994 as "subject to the conditions" set forth
37. 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1988).
38. H.R. Cong. Res. 204, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Exec. Order No. 12,167, 44
Fed. Reg. 61,167 (1979).
39. VLADIMIR N. PREGER, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, MOsT-FAvoRED-NATION STATUS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (1993).
40. Id. at 2.
41. Id.
42. Exec. Order No. 12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1993) states as follows:
CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS FOR THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994
WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern
about the appropriateness of unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status
for the People's Republic of China (China);
[Vol. 17:611
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therein.43 President Clinton's attachment of specific conditions
to his renewal was probably necessary to avoid a congressional
veto.44
It is unclear from the text of the Executive Order whether
all the conditions must be met prior to granting MFN status or
if some are only advisory, The language of the Executive Order
WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American people
regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human
rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and trade;
WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's MFN
status as a means of achieving progress in these areas;
WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be served by a
continuation of the waiver of the application of sections 402 (a) and (b) of the Trade Act
of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432(a) and 2432(b)) (Act) on China's MFN status for an additional
12 months with renewal thereafter subject to the conditions below;
NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as
follows:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of State (Secretary) shall make a recommendation to the
President to extend or not to extend MFN status to China for the 12-month period
beginning July 3, 1994.
(a) In making this recommendation the Secretary shall not recommend extension
unless he determines that:
-extension will substantially promote the freedom of emigration objectives of
section 402 of the Act; and
-China is complying with the 1992 bilateral agreement between the United States
and China concerning prison labor.
(b) In making this recommendation the Secretary shall also determine whether
China has made overall, significant progress with respect to the following:
-taking steps to begin adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
-releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned
or detained for the non-violent expression of their political and religious beliefs,
including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and
Tiananmen Square movements;
-ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by
international humanitarian and human rights organizations;
-protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and
-permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.
SEC. 2. The Secretary shall submit his recommendation to the President before
June 3, 1994.
SEC. 3. The Secretary, and other appropriate officials of the United States, shall
pursue resolutely all legislative and executive actions to ensure that China abides by its
commitments to follow fair, nondiscriminatory trade practices in dealing with U.S.
businesses, and adheres to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile
Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters, and other nonproliferation
commitments.
SEC. 4. This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable by any person or entity against the United States, its officers, or employees.
43. Id.
44. For descriptions of the several more restrictive legislative bills see PREGER,
supra note 39, at 5.
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suggests that compliance with the clauses listed in Section 1(a)
(freedom of emigration and prison labor) is mandatory,45 but
that the United States expects only "overall, significant pro-
gress" rather than full compliance with those clauses listed in
Section 1(b) (taking steps to begin adhering to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,46 releasing political and religious
detainees, treating prisoners humanely, protecting Tibet's heri-
tage, and permitting international broadcasts into China).47
Section 3 of the Executive Order relates to fair trade and
weapons nonproliferation commitments.48 The language of this
section suggests that U.S. officials are directed to pursue com-
pliance by China in those areas, but it is not clear from the lan-
guage whether further renewal of MFN status is conditioned on
such compliance. The placement of this Section after the dis-
cussion of the Secretary of State's recommendation to the Presi-
dent implies that these are not conditions but are independent
directives to U.S. officials in charge of compliance. If this analy-
sis is correct, the areas addressed in section 3 may technically
remain outside the scope of MFN considerations.
The Executive Order can be described as a noble attempt to
move China's leadership toward compliance with international
standards of human rights. The carrot of further renewals of
MFN status (or, conversely, the stick of MFN status with-
drawal) provides, however, a clumsy tool for achieving that
goal. The stated all-or-nothing character of renewal makes the
Secretary's recommendation both more important and more
difficult.4 9
If MFN status renewal had not been granted in 1994, some
leverage may have remained with respect to the possible exten-
sion at some later time. But if MFN had not been renewed
there would almost certainly have been retaliation of some sort,
45. See Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 42.
46. G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. doc A/810 (1948).
47. Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 42.
48. "The Secretary, and other appropriate officials of the United States, shall
pursue resolutely all legislative and executive actions to ensure that China abides by its
commitments to follow fair, nondiscriminatory trade practices in dealing with U.S.
businesses, and adheres to... nonproliferation commitments." Id. § 3.
49. Just as this Article was going to press, the President announced the extension
of MFN status for China for the next 12 months, and announced a disconnection of
trade status from human rights in connection with future extensions. Presumably,
however, the emigration standards imposed by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment will
remain in place. The extent of a congressional challenge, if any, to the President's
extension was not yet known.
[Vol. 17:611
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including higher tariffs or more restrictive quotas on the import
of U.S. goods into China.50 Other countermeasures, such as the
recall of China's overseas students and additional restrictions
on emigration, may have been taken.5 1 The spiraling imposi-
tion of measures and countermeasures might have led to a dete-
rioration of China-U.S. relations to the point where the
possibility of a re-extension of MFN in 1995 would not seem
likely enough to serve as further leverage for improving human
rights in China.
Of all the conditions in the Executive Order, the require-
ment that China make overall, significant progress52 in taking
steps to begin adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was the most difficult to monitor. The Declaration cov-
ers thirty articles including rights as diverse as those relating
to torture or degrading punishment;53 arbitrary arrest, deten-
tion, or exile;54 fair and public hearings by an independent and
impartial tribunal;55 freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state;56 peaceful assembly;5" protec-
tion against unemployment;5 rest and leisure;59 and "a stan-
dard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services."60 Such a wide range of
rights may be difficult for any nation to guarantee its people.
Moreover, the legal status of the Declaration has not been
clear. For example, contrast the remarks of the United States
representative in the United Nations General Assembly at the
time of the Declaration's adoption with the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral's remarks in 1971. According to the United States' Repre-
50. "If China is denied MFN status, it is expected to retaliate in the marketplace by
closing its doors to many [U.S.] exports." Joe Haberstrob, Biting into a Big Market:
Apple Growers Aim for China, SEATrLE TMEs/POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 4, 1994, at
A16. "PRC authorities would view the termination of MFN status as not just a trade
sanction but as a hostile political act." SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 5. "Trade retaliation
is almost a certainty if we deny China MFN status." Id. at 6. One author suggests "the
collapse of U.S. exports to China would cost well over 100,000 American jobs."
OVERHOLT, supra note 20, at 394.
51. SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 5.
52. Exec. Order No. 12,850, supra note 42, § 1(b).
53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 46, art. 5.
54. Id. art. 9.
55. Id. art. 10.
56. Id. art. 13.
57. Id. art. 20.
58. Id. art. 23.
59. Id. art. 24.
60. Id. art. 25.
6191994]
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sentative, the Declaration "is not a treaty; it is not an
international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a
statement of law or of legal obligation."61 In contrast, the U.N.
Secretary-General claimed that "Id]uring the years since its
adoption the declaration has come, through its influence in a
variety of contexts, to acquire a status extending beyond that
originally intended for it." 62 Both these statements differ from
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, which provides that "[t]he United States has fre-
quently reiterated its acceptance of the Universal Declaration,
and whatever legal character it applies to the United States."63
3. Grounds for Opposition to Further Renewal
There is a large and politically formidable coalition that
shares an interest in reducing imports from China for reasons
other than those relating to human rights.64 This coalition
includes opponents to various Chinese policies, such as nuclear
testing and arms sales to Pakistan, as well as U.S. businesses
in competition with imported Chinese goods.65
.The fact that Chinese producers are major exporters to U.S.
buyers does not please U.S. producers of similar goods.66 The
merchandise-trade deficit with China increased to $18.2 billion
in 1992, the second largest U.S. bilateral trade imbalance
behind Japan's.67 The U.S.-China trade deficit grew to $23 bil-
lion in 1993, reflecting $27 billion in U.S. imports and $4 billion
in exports.68
The large amount of goods imported into the United States
from China, which sell at lower prices, reflecting the lower cost
of production in China, leads the U.S. producers of comparable
goods to desire protection from competition. This group could
cast an argument in terms of human rights to gain more sup-
61. Eleanor Roosevelt, Statement to the General Assembly, 19 DEP'T ST. BULL. 751
(1948).
62. 1971 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw A/CN.4/245, reprinted in Louis HENKIN ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 607 (3d ed. 1993).
63. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 149-50
(1987).
64. Bruce Reynolds, Misperceptions Permeate and Poison Our Relations with
China, N.Y. Th, sF, Feb. 15, 1994, at A20.
65. See, e.g., H.R. 1835, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
66. See Reynolds, supra note 64.
67. WAYNE MORRISON, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 1 (1993).
68. Chili Kwan Chen, Chinese Economy Threatens To Pull Ours Down, N.Y. TmIEs,
Feb. 3, 1994, at A20.
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porters in excluding imports from China, even though the
group's primary concern may not be human rights. It would be
ironic if good-hearted Americans who wish more human rights
for the Chinese are swayed to the side of some U.S. producers
whose main interest may be protection from the competition
posed by imported goods.
4. China's View as Meddling in Internal Affairs
China's leadership interprets America's conditional
renewal of MFN as meddling in internal affairs.6 9 Such an
interpretation may lead, in turn, to greater resistance from Chi-
nese political leaders. As Deng Xiaoping told Richard Nixon in
October 1989, "If you want China to beg, it cannot be
arranged."7
0
It can be argued that because China has accepted interna-
tional monitoring of human rights conditions under the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, and has even voted to monitor
activities in South Africa, China cannot object to monitoring in
its own country. Such an argument may be valid if China were
objecting to a proposal by the U.N. or other international body
to monitor human rights conditions in China. The argument
carries less weight, however, when the outside monitoring and
determination are made by only one other country, the United
States.
China's accusation that the United States is meddling in its
internal affairs is, for the Chinese, emotionally charged. The
average Chinese is painfully aware that the Western powers
carved eastern China into "concessions" and imposed Western
laws on Chinese nationals in China who dealt with Westerners.
At the same time, Westerners made settlements of their own in
China in which they were immune to all Chinese law.7 That
69. Li Peng, Address to the National People's Congress, reprinted in Li Peng's
Reports on Economic and Government Priorities, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Mar. 11, 1994, at pt. 3.
70. Patrick Tyler, Chinese Issuing What May Be Deng's Final Book, N.Y. TnMEs,
Nov. 4, 1993, at A3.
71. Inauspiciously, the modern phase of relations between China and Western
powers began when China attempted to restrict the importation of Indian-grown opium
by the British East India Company. The British engaged in the Opium War of 1841 to
keep open their market. The British and French combined to fight China 15 years later
to force the receipt of their diplomats and traders. This second war more resembled a
deliberate looting and burning of the emperor's extensive summer palace in Peking.
The resulting treaties of Nanking (1842) and Tientsin (1857) ceded the island of Hong
Kong outright and established Kowloon, Shanghai, Canton, and other areas as "treaty
1994]
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state of affairs, lasting from the 1840s until the early part of
this century,72 may seem long ago and far away. Yet, in our
own American political consciousness, events such as Paul
Revere's ride or Patrick Henry's speech typically bring forth an
immediate and emotional response of pride and patriotism,
notwithstanding that the events took place even longer ago. We
should therefore be able to understand China's even more
immediate and emotional response to efforts by the United
States to affect legal relationships on Chinese territory.73
It is unlikely that China's leaders will be moved by an
appeal to morality by the United States. The conditioning of
MFN status renewal on progress in human rights in China is
seen as an unwanted intrusion into local politics. Although
MFN status renewal may have enough economic leverage to
move China's leaders to some degree, political leverage works in
the opposite direction and may more than offset the economic
leverage.
ports." R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 702 (4th ed.
1971). Further, the importation of opium was legalized, a low tariff was established for
it, and China had to pay indemnities to the victor governments. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA Opium Wars 967 (1990). After the First World War, the first aim of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen and others in China was to shake off the "treaty system." PALMER & COLTON,
supra, at 835. These deep feelings continued, so that after 1949 the new Communist
leaders "were articulate spokesmen for a universal hostility to Western imperialism
that had all but carved their country to pieces in the nineteenth century...." Id. at 948
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
72. This period lasted even longer. By one definition, "critics of modern colonialism
... considered China between 1900 and 1930 as a colony of the West because of the
economic dominance of certain European and American countries and the impotence of
the central Chinese government .... ." 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Colony 85 (1973).
73. There has even been resistance within the United States to our being held to
international standards of human rights. See, e.g., Louis HENICN, THE AGE OF RIGHTs
74, 77 (1990).
From the beginning, the international human rights movement was conceived
by the United States as designed to improve the condition of human rights in
countries other than the United States (and a very few like-minded liberal
states) .... It did not strongly favor but it also did not resist the move to
develop international agreements and international law, but, again, it saw
them as designed for other states. But the resistance in the United States is
deeper. There is resistance to imposing national standards on some matters
that have long been deemed "local"; even more, there is resistance to accepting
international standards, and international scrutiny, on matters that have been
for the United States to decide. A deep isolationism continues to motivate
many Americans, even some who are eager to judge others as by interceding on
behalf of human rights in other countries.
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5. Nonpolitical Measures of Human Rights
There are different perspectives on the meaning of human
rights and on the ideal role of a government toward its citizens.
These different perspectives exist even within the United
States. For example, many Americans firmly believe that fed-
eral and state governments owe a duty to provide their citizens
with freedom from want by providing subsidized food, educa-
tion, and health care. Others equally believe those govern-
ments owe a greater duty to provide maximum freedom of
action and opportunity by minimizing regulation and taxation
of private activity.
The same tension and differing perspectives exist within
China.v4 For example, a poor farmer in an inland province may
view the desire to vote for one's political leaders or to speak
publicly on political matters as less pressing than the desire to
increase the number of meals per day from two to three. Thus,
the official government program of heavily regulating private
activity so as to maximize economic benefits for all may seem
justified and desirable to many Chinese.
Even within the area of economic development there are
irresolvable internal conflicts. For example, it is clear that
China's overpopulation has contributed to famine, but the gov-
ernment's program to reduce overpopulation by limiting fami-
lies to one child has been quite unpopular both with citizens of
China and with human rights observers outside China.75
The U.S. government seems primarily concerned with
China's suppression of individual civil liberties and political
rights. 7' The State Department believes that
experience demonstrates that it is individual freedom that
sets the stage for economic and social development; it is
repression that stifles it.... Those who try to justify subordi-
nating political and civil rights on the ground that they are
74. See Patrick Tyler, Crossroads for China, N.Y. TnMEs, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al. In
general, China has retained the traditional notion that the rights of individuals are
subordinate to collective rights. Rights in China must stem from some positive law and
are usually coupled with a corresponding duty to the state. This is in contrast to rights
in liberal states, which stem from some metaphyiscal source, for example, the
"inalienable rights" referred to in the U.S. Declaration of Independence. See, e.g., R.
RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HuMAN RIGHrS IN CoNTEMPoRARY CHINA 21 (1986).
75. William Oddie, Sunday Comment: Banned Parenthood, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct.
11, 1993, at 27.
76. Michael Desombre & Jeffrey Sims, Recent Developments, HARv. IN'IL L.J. 621,
627 (1992).
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concentrating on economic aspirations invariably deliver
neither. That is why we consider it imperative to focus
urgent attention on violations of basic political and civil
rights.7
7
In contrast, the Chinese government view is that developing the
economy, at least so as to avoid starvation and homelessness, is
more important than assuring political freedoms.78
Abraham Maslow's famous "hierarchy of needs" argues that
people first desire freedom from hunger, cold, and the elements,
and then seek higher-order needs such as self-actualization.79
Former President Carter agrees:
[The Chinese] (and leaders in other socialist countries) point
out, correctly, that there is a wide range of human rights,
some of which are respected in their countries and neglected
in the United States. These include the right to have a home,
a job and health care. It is self-satisfying for us Americans to
emphasize freedom of speech, the press, religion and assem-
bly as the only important human rights.80
III. THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
There is a direct link between China's economic develop-
ment and the human rights enjoyed by its people. This relation-
ship can be made clearer by examining the Chinese economy,
and the misguided "reward-versus-punishment" view held by
the United States with regard to MFN status.
A. Chinese Economy
The issue of whether to extend MFN status to China is
hotly debated in the American press and conscience. During
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in
Seattle last November, some commentators argued that we
should not put business negotiations before human rights.8 '
This view (popular in America) assumes that an emphasis on
77. Id. at 627 (quoting U.S. DEFT. OF STATE, CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1990 XI (1991)).
78. Id. at 628.
79. See generally ArmRmua MASLOW, MoTrvAToN AND PERSONAL=rI (1954);
ABRAHAM MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1962).
80. Jimmy Carter, Extend China's Trade Status, L.A. DAILY J., May 9, 1991, at 6.
81. See, e.g., Mike Jendrzejczyk, But Human Rights Can't Be Bartered, SEATTLE
POSToINTELLIGENCER, Nov. 12, 1993, at All.
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trading relationships, either by nation-states or by private busi-
nesses within those states, is hostile or at best indifferent to
human rights conditions.
Nonetheless, there is a strong empirical argument, even if
counterintuitive, that increasing imports from China into the
United States will ameliorate rather than worsen human rights
in China. First, as discussed above, improvement of basic eco-
nomic conditions is considered by many to be a human right,
although many people in industrialized countries take their rel-
ative affluence for granted. Second, the economic security cre-
ated by increased trade in China will help its growing middle
class exert its own political power.
The Chinese still have a long way to go in acquiring ade-
quate food supplies, running water, shelter, transportation, and
other amenities of modern material life.8 2 China's economy is
indeed huge in absolute terms8 3 because of the sheer size of the
population, 4 but the Chinese remain relatively poor on a per
capita basis.8 5
While increased trade will help build China's middle class,
loss of MFN status would destroy trade and further impoverish
China. Chinese manufacturers are major suppliers to United
States' buyers of certain categories of toys, games, clothing,
footwear, and electrical devices.8 6 The tariff on certain knitted
sweaters, for example, is currently six percent of customs value,
but if MFN is revoked the tariff would increase to sixty per-
cent.8 ' The tariff on most toys would increase from approxi-
mately seven percent to seventy percent.8 8
These increases would no doubt cause the quantity of
imports from China to plummet. A revocation of MFN status by
82. The number of people living in absolute poverty in 1985 is estimated to have
been 100 million, down from 200 to 270 million in 1978. China: The Titan Stirs,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 3, 4 [hereinafter The Titan Stirs]. While one hears the
number of Mercedes and other expensive foreign cars is increasing in China, the Author
observed on the drive from the Beijing airport into the city that as of the summer of
1993 such cars are not as numerous as donkey carts and horse-drawn wooden
buckboards. Similarly, the Author observed that even in Shanghai, China's most
cosmopolitan city, bicycles still far outnumber all automobiles.
83. The Chinese economy is considered the world's 3rd or 4th largest, behind only
the United States, Japan, and perhaps Germany. The Titan Stirs, supra note 82.
84. China contains approximately 1.2 billion people; more than one fifth of the
earth's current population. Id. at 4, 5.
85. See id. at 5.
86. MoRisoN, supra note 67, at 4.
87. HARMONIZED TARinF SCHEDULE, supra note 21, at 61-37.
88. Id. at 95-3.
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the United States for imports from Chinese businesses would
likely have a devastating effect on the economic prosperity of
many Chinese businesses and their owners and employees.
Large quantities of exports by Chinese firms are good for
economic development there. Human rights in China will natu-
rally improve with economic development and the expansion of
a middle class.8 9 It has been argued that democracy and per-
sonal freedom are artifacts of economic development itself.9° It
has even been argued that economic development will lead to
world peace. 91
89. This has been eloquently stated by Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant
Secretary of State for Asian Affairs:
In 1977 Deng Xiaoping saved China from the Cultural Revolution and gave it a
remarkable decade of economic development .... But he could not shake his
memories of China's continual turmoil, and feared that it would recur if he
allowed a similar lessening of the political authority of the party.
So . . . he offered the Chinese a deal that not all of them were willing to
accept: he would give them increasing economic and cultural freedom while
retaining total political control in the party's hands. The failure of this
approach was inevitable ....
For all his achievements, Deng made an absolutely basic mistake. He did
not recognize that economic development creates pressure for political
development. The more successful his economic program, the greater the
pressure would be for political liberalization. And the more he allowed, even
encouraged, Chinese students to study abroad, the more certain he was to
create the conditions for a crisis between hard-line party officials and a new
elite infected with such dangerous ideas as freedom of choice.
Richard Holbrooke, A Dilemma for Washington, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1989, at 32.
One of China's leading dissidents agrees that Deng's "deal" is doomed to fail:
What will emerge in China is a mixture of these many forces, but it will not be
the kind of mixture that this regime wants. It will not mix economic freedom
with political unfreedom. Communism and capitalism are so completely differ-
ent that no one will be fooled for long that they can be joined.
Liu Binyan, Civilization Grafting, FoREiGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 19, 21.
90. Robert L. Bartley, The Case for Optimism, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 15,
17.
Development creates a middle class that wants a say in its own future, that
cares about the progress and freedom of its sons and daughters. Since
economic progress depends principally on this same group, with its drive for
education and creative abilities, this desire can be suppressed only at the
expense of development.
In the early stages of development, as for example in Guangdong, the
ruling elites may be able to forge an accommodation with the middle class,
particularly if local military authorities are dealt into the action. But if the
Chinese accommodation survives, it will be the first one.
Id.
91. Id. at 17.
[H]istory teaches another profoundly optimistic lesson:.., democracies almost
never go to war with each other. The dominant flow of historical forces in the
21st century could well be this: economic development leads to demands for
democracy and individual (or familial) autonomy; instant worldwide
Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates
B. The Fallacy of Reward vs. Punish the Government
The MFN issue is often approached in terms of whether the
leaders in Beijing should be rewarded or punished.92 This Arti-
cle suggests this is a misdirected inquiry.
China is not a "black box" in which internal ingredients
cannot be seen or understood from the outside. Market develop-
ments have recently allowed aspiring entrepreneurs to gain
limited economic freedoms. Those new-found freedoms have
been used by entrepreneurs to build businesses with which they
hope to obtain a measure of security for themselves and their
families. 93 These economic forces have tended to reduce the
power of the Communist Party and have led to the beginnings
of a legal system through which Chinese citizens can remedy
wrongs.94
By renewing MFN tariffs for the products manufactured by
those Chinese entrepreneurs, the United States would help
with their continued acquisition of economic and political
power. The United States would also give credibility to the
reformist politicians at the provincial level who have supported
economic development and trade with the outside world.
Revoking MFN status will likely have little or no effect on
the prosperity or lifestyle of the central government leaders,
who may be expected to provide for themselves under most
national economic conditions. Indeed, revoking MFN status
will vindicate their fear of relying on outside trading powers. It
will tend to strengthen the role of government as a smaller per-
centage of the Chinese economy is trade related and a higher
percentage is dependent on government purchases.
Thus, ironically, if the United States revokes MFN status it
will reward the hard-line central government and will punish
the reform-minded politicians and the more liberal, outward-
looking people of China.95
communications reduce the power of oppressive governments; the spread of
democratic states diminishes the potential for conflict.
Id.
92. See, e.g., Harry Wu, Favored-Nation Trade Status Rewards China's Gulag
System, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 8, 1994, at All.
93. See Patrick Tyler, Rights in China Improve, Envoy Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1,
1994, at Al.
94. Id.; Liu Binyan, Deng's Pyrrhic Victory: China After Tiananmen Square, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 2, 1989, at 21.
95. But see, Wu, supra note 92, at All. Mr. Wu, himself a political prisoner in
China from 1960 through 1979 and now a Hoover Institution resident scholar, argues
that MFN trade status encourages the continuation of prison labor for export and that
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IV. SHIFTS OF POWER FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS TO
CITIZENS
Throughout history, political and economic power has
shifted away from central governments and towards citizens,
and with that shift has come increased human rights for citi-
zens. One reason for these shifts has been the rise of an inter-
nal and relatively affluent class. This phenomenon can be seen
historically in Western civilizations and currently in China, as
well as other Asian nations.
A. Western Historical Perspective
Political rights have historically been imposed upon
national leaders by the relatively more powerful and affluent
segments from within those societies. 96 Rarely have they been
imposed from without. As one example, in June 1215 certain
barons in England forcefully negotiated the first issue of the
Magna Carta with King John. They sought to ameliorate the
arbitrary and extortionate methods of taxation being used at
that time for supporting the King's foreign wars, to protect
themselves from the ruthless and brutal reprisals against tax
defaulters, and to provide redress for wrongs suffered.9 7 Two
clauses of the Magna Carta have been widely interpreted in
English law, and in legal systems deriving therefrom, to provide
a wide range of political and human rights:
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his
standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force
against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.
"the United States must help China's brave and suffering millions by cutting off most-
favored-nation treatment this year." Id. This Author equally despises forced labor by,
and torture of, political prisoners, but thinks developing the general economy and
opening the country to outside influence is a surer path to that needed reform. Indeed,
one of the root causes of the forced labor is the current need for hard currency. That
need would be reduced with increasing exports by a free, private sector, while that need
would only be increased if the exporting sector is weakened by an inability to sell into
the U.S. market.
96. See, e.g., JAMEs NEAT PiuMM, THE A~mciAN EXPERIENCE 61 (1973). In the
colonial assemblies of New York, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Maryland, 85% of the members were wealthy. Id.
97. G.R.C. DAvis, MAGNA CARTA 9, 10 (The British Library 1992 reprint).
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To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or
justice.9 s
The English barons were in a position of power to secure these
rights for themselves at that time, and they did so.
Similarly, five and a half centuries later the American colo-
nies' Declaration of Independence from England was drafted by
the relatively educated and affluent landowners of that soci-
ety.99 Although France helped in the ensuing armed struggle to
prove and maintain that independence, the original impetus
and power came from within the society.100
B. The Shift of Power in China
A prosperous business community in China is starting to
shift power within China. One example of this is the increased
access the business community has provided to domestic and
international communications with devices such as fax
machines and satellite television.' 01 These communications
devices were critical in establishing the networks of demonstra-
tors in 1989 and in relaying news into and out of China. News
of the demonstrations in the coastal provinces was also commu-
nicated to Chinese people in the inner regions via the relatively
independent domestic television and radio stations.10 2 There
are 215 million radio receivers in China (one for every five peo-
ple), but only seventy-five million televisions (one for every six-
teen people) and eleven million telephones (one for every 109
people).10 3
There is a larger, general argument that the traditional
nation-state is threatened by economic development and world
integration:
98. Id. at 28. These are the 39th and 40th of the substantive clauses, which were
not numbered in the original document. (Translation in source).
99. PRiMm, supra note 96.
100. It is ironic that the level of tariffs on imported products perhaps from China
played a prominent role in the American colonies' early shift toward independence, in
the form of the tea upon which the imposition of high tariffs by the British Parliament
drove "a group of responsible citizens" to throw the product from three British cargo
ships into the harbor in the famous "Boston Tea Party." 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
991 (1973).
101. Tyler, supra note 93.
102. See generally Mark Hopkins, Watching China Change, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 35.
103. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, A WORLD FACTmOOK 1992 72 (1993). The
Author speculates that China's geography and economy may encourage quick
development of a cellular telephone infrastructure. See, e.g., Sid Gorham & Achmad M.
Chadran, Communicating on the Go, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 26.
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Transnational companies and regional development
leave the nation-state searching for a mission ....
These difficulties confront all governments, but they are
doubly acute for authoritarians who depend on isolation to
dominate their people.... In 1993 Freedom House reports. ..
only thirty-one percent of the world's population, and most of
that in China, living under repressive regimes, down from
forty-four percent ten years ago. The combination of instant
information, economic interdependence and the appeal of
individual freedom is not a force to be taken lightly.'
0 4
The Chinese government issued new regulations in October
1993 banning private ownership and operation of satellite
dishes except under limited circumstances. 10 5 No doubt, this
ban was in recognition of the threat to governmental control
posed by such devices.
C. Shifts of Power in Other Asian Countries
If the application of deductive logic has not yet persuaded
the reader, please bear in mind Oliver Wendell Holmes's
famous maxim: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."10 6 It would be enlightening to test the above
logic by conducting a scientific experiment on two identical
economies, both controlled by authoritarian governments. One
economy would be pressured by the United States to improve its
human rights. If that pressure did not lead to satisfactory
results, the United States would revoke MFN status. In the
other identical economy, MFN status would be continued
unconditionally. If one compared the development of human
rights in the two economies, this Article predicts that human
rights would develop faster in the second economy than in the
first because of internal pressure from the middle class formed
as the result of economic development.
We are unable, however, to conduct such an experiment.
Nonetheless, the link between economic development and dem-
ocratic political development has actually been demonstrated in
countries with backgrounds similar to that of China. For exam-
ple, North and South Korea come quite close to serving as the
scientific experiment mentioned above. This Article will now
examine the recent political histories of Korea and Taiwan.
104. Bartley, supra note 90, at 16.
105. See COuNTRY REPoRTs 1993, supra note 7, at 11.




The people of the Korean peninsula share a common heri-
tage, language, and culture that traces its dynastic lineage back
over four thousand years.10 7 The Korean kingdom had been
occupied as a Japanese colony in 1910108 and remained under
Japanese control until liberation by Soviet and U.S. forces in
1945.109 In 1948 the peninsula was divided into two halves by a
line running roughly east and west along the thirty-eighth par-
allel. After the Korean War, a jagged cease fire line reaffirmed
the division. At this writing no peace treaty has been signed.110
For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these halves as North
Korea and South Korea, although the official names are the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of
Korea.
For purposes of this Article, let us assume North Korea was
initially controlled by an authoritarian government leaning
toward Marxism-Leninism along the Chinese example. Not
only has the United States not extended MFN status to North
Korea, but U.S. policy toward North Korea has been one of com-
plete trade isolation."1 This policy of isolation has not moved
the North Korean government to extend human rights to its cit-
izens or to comply with any other demands of the U.S. govern-
ment. Today, North Korea is one of the most repressive
societies in the world, and the citizens of North Korea remain
isolated and poor. 112
Let us assume South Korea was also initially controlled by
an authoritarian government, but one leaning toward martial
law based on a policy of anticommunism. The country was poor
and lacked the natural resources found in the north. The econ-
omy could be described as "state-guided capitalism" but was not
107. KI-BAIK LEE, A NEw HIsToRY OF KOREA 387 (Edward Wagner et al. trans.,
1984).
108. Id. at 313. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the egregious
human rights abuses inflicted by the occupying Japanese military, not only against
individual Koreans but against the Korean language, culture, and heritage on a broader
scale.
109. Id. at 375.
110. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, which established de facto
boundaries and mechanisms for enforcing the peace. 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
Korea 506 (1993).
111. See HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 21; see also 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(f)(1) (1988) (restricting U.S. foreign assistance to North Korea).
112. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA North Korea 958-59 (1993).
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truly a free market economy. 1 3 Human rights abuses, in the
form of arbitrary arrest, detention, and even torture, were wide-
spread. Political power passed from one military leader to
another.1 14 Opposition to the established government was dealt
with brutally.115 But, over the years, South Korea has become
remarkably democratic. Human rights conditions have
improved substantially and show signs of continued
improvement. 1 16
As an example of the remarkable change in circumstances,
in May 1980 workers and students conducted a strike and dem-
onstration in Kwangju (a city in the southwestern part of South
Korea) against the policies of former President Chun Doo
Hwan. 17 Among other things, the demonstrators demanded
more democratic freedoms. An elite unit of the army, including
paratroopers, crushed the demonstration with a great loss of
civilian life.""- Unlike the Tiananmen Square demonstration,
however, there was no coinciding media event such as Mikhail
Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in the spring of 1989. As a result,
the crackdown was not covered by foreign journalists with the
freedom to broadcast news and footage. Striking images were
not carried into United States' homes via television, and most
Americans remain unknowledgeable of and indifferent to the
Kwangju crackdown.
Nonetheless, the Kwangju incident cut deep into the South
Korean mentality, lastingly compromising Chun's
legitamacy. 119 During the 1980s and early 1990s, Koreans
annually marked the incident's anniversaries with remem-
brance demonstrations.' 20 The United States never revoked
113. The government owned financial institutions and directed businesses into
markets. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERiCANA Korea 556 (1992) [hereinafter Korea].
114. Park Chung Hee (an Army general) filled the void left when student
demonstrations caused the collapse of the government and the departure of the U.S.-
installed President Singh Man Rhee in 1961. President Park ruled until 1979 when he
was assassinated by the chief of the Korean CIA, which ironically had been Park's
primary instrument of civilian repression. Another Army general, Chun Doo Hwan, in
turn filled the ensuing void. President Chun ruled until 1988 when, in what has been
described as the country's first major peaceful transfer of political power, Chun's vice
president and chosen successor (another Army general, Roh Tae Woo) won the
scheduled presidential elections. See generally id. at 558-60.
115. Id. at 559.
116. See generally id. at 560.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA Kwangju 609 (1992).
119. Korea, supra note 113, at 560.
120. James Sterngold, The Tear Gas Clears, the Tension Remains, N.Y. TumS, May
27. 1990. at E3.
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MFN status, nor did it threaten to do S0.121 Indeed, the United
States continued the even lower GSP (Column 1) rates of duty
for developing countries. 1
22
The Kwangju cover-up finally ended recently with televised
hearings into the subject, including questioning of several top
leaders. These hearings were broadcast by television through-
out South Korea and were widely watched. Several factors
made this change of face possible, not the least of which was the
development of an educated and economically stable middle
class that had found its voice and the confidence to support the
traditional student demonstrators in standing up to their gov-
ernment and insisting on more control over their own lives.
Two other events built that sense of confidence. The first
was the holding of the Olympic games in Seoul in 1988,123
which in turn brought international visibility and increased
pressure for democracy upon Korea's government. That pres-
sure led to the second event, the peaceful transfer of presiden-
tial power for the first time in Korea's history.1 2 4
2. Taiwan
Another neighbor of China that warrants comparison is the
Republic of China, popularly known as Taiwan. 2  The U.S.
121. Korea, supra note 113, at 560. The United States remained quite friendly to
the South Korean government throughout its period of repression. The United States
provided financial and military aid and was seen as Korea's "big brother." The United
States considered good relations important for maintaining South Korea as a bulwark
against Communism. Unfortunately, some of the financial and military aid was used to
bolster the Korean government against its own people. The Author recalls the chagrin
expressed by an observer of student demonstrators being tear-gassed by Korean troops,
upon seeing a painted decal of the stylized handshake of friendship between the United
States and South Korea appearing on the side of the tear gas dispenser, indicating the
machine had been purchased with U.S. aid money.
122. Korea was "graduated" from GSP benefits in 1989 because of economic
development above the statutorily prescribed levels.
123. Korea, supra note 113, at 560.
124. Id. Having witnessed the tremendous liberating effects on human rights in
Korea resulting from the 1988 Seoul Olympics, this Author was disheartened to see so
many human rights-based arguments raised against awarding the sponsorship of the
2000 Olympics to Beijing. Beijing's human rights record should have been a factor in
favor of awarding the Olympic games to Beijing, for the very reason that, as in Seoul,
civic pride would lead the Chinese toward improvement of human rights conditions.
The foreign press typically gives uncontrollably intense scrutiny to modern Olympic
host cities. The resultant public opinion, as distinguished from the demands of another
government, is more likely to lead to progress in human rights.
125. China officially considers itself the rightful government over this "renegade
province." 28 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA Taiwan 375 (1993) [hereinafter Taiwan].
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economic treatment of Taiwan has differed markedly from its
trade policy toward the People's Republic of China.
General Chiang Kai-shek and his army were pushed into
Taiwan after losing military control over mainland China.
126
His political party, the Kuomintang, spread misrule and corrup-
tion throughout the island.'2 ' General Chiang's efforts to raise
money and resources in Taiwan to retake the mainland were
often at the expense of the local Taiwanese. 128 To consolidate
its power in Taiwan and remove opposition, the Kuomintang
massacred thousands of Taiwanese urban middle class in
1947.129
Yet U.S. foreign policy threw its political support in the
form of economic and military aid behind General Chiang
because the imperative of anticommunism was apparently
judged to be more important than the imperative of the observa-
tion of human rights. 3 ' Today, the Republic of China has
developed a thriving entrepreneurial class and has developed
political freedom far beyond the level known there previously.
As we have seen in the real-world experiments of South
Korea and Taiwan, economic development does in fact lead to a
loosening of control by central governments that are no longer
able to keep up with the complexities of a modern, growing, and
powerful private sector. North Korea, on the other hand, has
not developed economically. It remains isolated from the
United States, and it shows the least improvement in human
rights. Obviously, it would be better to cooperate with China
and help it follow the paths of South Korea and Taiwan rather
than to isolate China and risk it following the path of North
Korea.
V. HYPocRisY IN U.S. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY
As we saw in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, the
United States buttressed anticommunist military allies despite
their significant internal human rights violations. Any hypoc-
risy perceived by China in the application of human rights stan-
dards by the United States will be counterproductive if the
126. Id. at 381.
127. 26 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA Taiwan 238 (1992).
128. Taiwan, supra note 125, at 381.
129. Id.
130. 22 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA Taiwan 40 (1988).
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Chinese government senses that it is the object of
discrimination.
There is the danger not only of externally different stan-
dards by the United States, but internally different standards
as well. Not so long ago (by the measure of a civilization as old
as China), the legal system of the United States allowed one
person to buy, own, and sell other persons as chattel. 131 The
U.S. government has forcibly relocated its own indigenous
populations (e.g., Cherokees), contained them (e.g., Navajos),
and gone to war with them (e.g., Sioux). Even more recently,
women and minorities fought their way into participation in the
political process, and today continue the fight to attain fully
equal rights in the workplace.
Americans may feel their country has learned from its his-
torical mistakes and is in the process of achieving the proper
balance between security and freedom of action. Yet the cur-
rent prevalence in the United States of drug and alcohol abuse,
homelessness, and violent crime is unlikely to inspire the lead-
ers of other countries. America has, for the moment, prioritized
one set of freedoms (e.g., opportunity, political dissent, gun
ownership) over others (e.g., employment, housing, health care,
safety from crime). America may believe it has retained its
moral ascendancy and may lecture China on human rights, but
China is likely to return the lecture in kind and feel justified in
doing so.
V1. CONCLUSION
Without apologizing for, or trivializing, recent and current
human rights violations in China, it must be noted for the sake
of honesty and perspective that human rights in China have
improved markedly in recent decades.'3 2 Furthermore, human
131. The 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1865.
132. The following are the personal views of Singapore's former Permanent
Representative to the United Nations:
Western behavior toward China has been equally puzzling. In the 1970s, the
West developed a love affair with a China ruled by a regime that had
committed gross atrocities during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution. But when Mao Zedong's disastrous rule was followed by a far more
benign Deng Xiaoping era, the West punished China for what by its historical
standards was a minor crackdown: the Tiananmen incident.
Unfortunately, Tiananmen has become a contemporary Western legend,
created by live telecasts of the crackdown. Beijing erred badly in its excessive
use of firearms but it did not err in its decision to crack down. Failure to quash
the student rebellion could have led to political disintegration and chaos, a
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rights violations continue to occur in many countries of the
world, including the United States. Nonetheless, few countries
are denied MFN treatment because of human rights violations.
Despite the fact that human rights in China have markedly
improved over recent decades, notwithstanding a few notable
setbacks, they still need improvement. No one can argue, mor-
ally, that the United States should intentionally take action to
worsen the human rights situation in China. Our country's
actions, if based on a simplistic understanding of the Chinese
people and government, may nonetheless have precisely that
effect. Chinese victims of human rights violations are better
served by effective actions than by well-meaning but ineffectual
protestations.
Economic development provides impetus toward democrati-
zation. We have seen precisely this phenomenon occurring in
several other Asian nations. Although none has yet achieved
full Western-style democracy, each has achieved economic
development to a level that its citizens are comfortable with
using their affluence to gain political power. The balance of
power is thus shifting away from the central governments and
toward the people, which certainly is a measure of democracy if
not the full achievement of it.
The best course of action for the United States government
is to continue MFN tariff status for imports of products from
China and to increase business, educational, and social contacts
between the people of both nations. Imposing punitively high
tariffs on products manufactured by Chinese people is not the
right tool for the job that needs to be done. If the United States
imposes discriminatory tariffs on Chinese products it will, quite
ironically, hurt the very people it most wants to help.
perennial Chinese nightmare. Western policymakers concede this in
private.... No major Western journal has ... developed the political courage to
say that China had virtually no choice in Tiananmen. Instead sanctions were
imposed, threatening China's modernization. Asians see that Western public
opinion-deified in Western democracy-can produce irrational consequences.
They watch with trepidation as Western policies on China lurch to and fro,
threatening the otherwise smooth progress of East Asia.
Mahbubani, supra note 2, at 10, 12-13.
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